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THE REDLINING BATTLE CONTINUES: 
DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT V. BUSINESS 
NECESSITY UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
John K. Lucey* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The passage of the Civil War Amendments1 provided the neces-
sary constitutional springboard for the century-long battle to end 
race discrimination in the United States. Resistance to the 
prospects of racial equality resulted in such temporary setbacks 
as the judicial doctrine of separate but equal,1 but significant pro-
gress has nevertheless been made. As the forms of discrimination 
have become more subtle, courts have developed sophisticated 
doctrinal tools with which to combat racism. Examples include 
the categorization of race as an inherently suspect classification 
requiring the demonstration of a compelling state interest before 
the classification will be permitted,S and the prohibition against 
laws which are fair in form yet discriminatory in application.· 
The chronology of the school desegregation cases l dramatically il-
lustrates the complexity and pervasiveness of the discrimination 
* Articles and Citations Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing 
equal protection and due process); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (guaranteeing the right to vote 
regardless of race, color, or previous servitude). 
• See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
• See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1 (1967); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
• Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
• See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Green v. County School Bd. of 
New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 
402 U.S. 1 (1971); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 
413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
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problem which has required active judicial intervention in fash-
ioning the necessary and appropriate relief. 
Many of the difficulties encountered in bringing about inte-
grated schools are linked to the problems of neighborhood segre-
gation.· Like school segregation, the causes and cures of neighbor-
hood segregation are complex. The barriers which blacks and 
other minority groups face in obtaining decent housing may not 
be the result of overt discrimination as manifested in refusals to 
sell or rent.7 Rather, part of the problem can be traced to the 
economic consequences of poverty and the concomitant inability 
of an individual to obtain mortgage financing for the purchase of 
a home. This problem has become particularly acute in recent 
months with soaring interest rates, accelerating inflation, and a 
shortage of loanable funds.8 Typically, poor people can only af-
ford to live in old, deteriorating neighborhoods often located in 
large urban areas. To the extent that individual properties in 
these areas are in poor condition, the prices asked for these 
properties will be low and their value as collateral for a mortgage 
loan is diminished.9 Low income buyers, however, face additional 
hurdles in their search for mortgage funds where lending institu-
• Congress' belief that the lack of integrated housing was in part responsible for segrega-
tion in schools was one reason why a fair housing law was enacted. Laufman v. Oakley 
Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 496-97 (S.D. Ohio 1976). This housing law is the Fair 
Housing Act (Title VIII), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979) (amended 
1978). 
• See, e.g., United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 936 (1974); Lucas v. Hooper, 381 F. Supp. 1222 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Zuch v. Hus-
sey, 366 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Mich. 1973); Williamson v. Hampton Mgmt. Co., 339 F. Supp. 
1146 (N.D. ill. 1972). 
• In March, 1980, an Associated Press survey revealed that mortgage rates ranged from 
141f2 % to 16% nationwide, compared with an average of 13% in February, 1980, and only 
101;4 % one year ago. Boston Globe, March 14, 1980, at 1, col. 5. Higher interest rates may 
drastically increase the monthly costs of a mortgage. For example, a $50,000 mortgage with 
a pay-back period of 30 years at an interest rate of 101;4 % would cost the borrower $448.06 
per month. The same loan at 16% would increase the monthly payments to $673.38, a gain 
of approximately 50%. Id. at 7, col. 1. It is unlikely that low income persons who were 
barely able to afford a mortgage a year ago would realize substantial increases in their 
iJ;1comes sufficient to cover this year's increased carrying costs. Even those who would oth-
erwise qualify are finding it difficult to secure a mortgage because lending institutions do 
not have the funds. With the increased availability of more attractive investment alterna-
tives, depositors are withdrawing their money from low-yielding savings accounts, a major 
source of mortgage funds. Id. at 6, col. 1. Where banks are faced with a scarcity of funds, it 
makes se~se that they will allocate those funds among the more affluent and less risky 
applicants, thus putting a tighter squeeze on lower income borrowers. 
• Factors which determine the value of the collateral are enumerated in the text at note 
175, infra. 
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tions generalize about the condition of the property and the in-
come level in specific neighborhoods. The process whereby these 
generalizations are reduced to a blanket refusal to grant mortgage 
loans in certain neighborhoods has been labeled "redlining." Red-
lining is commonly defined as the systematic refusal of lending 
institutions to grant mortgage loans in a particular neighborhood 
regardless of the creditworthiness of the applicant or the condi-
tion of the property offered as collateral. 10 
Determining precisely why mortgage applications are granted 
or denied is a formidable task insofar as an individual lending 
decision comprises a complex set of variables.ll Fundamentally, a 
lending institution will attempt to maximize long-term profits by 
minimizing the risk of loss associated with the loans which it 
grants. Overall risk of loss on a particular application can be pre-
\0 See, e.g., Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U. L. REv. 989, 989 
(1976). Much attention has focused on the subject of redlining because of the belief that it 
is a major cause of urban decay. According to conventional wisdom, the process of neigh-
borhood decline begins with the bank's decision to disinvest in a particular neighborhood. 
The decision is based on a perception of increased risk of neighborhood deterioration and 
results in potential buyers being steered to other areas while current residents are unable 
to secure home improvement loans. The inability to renovate causes homes to deteriorate 
and the inability to find potential buyers further reduces the incentive to maintain the 
properties. Eventually, financially able residents will leave their homes creating an excess 
supply of housing and driving down prices. Where the market value of a home falls below 
the outstanding principal on the mortgage, it will be in the economic interests of the own-
er to default. The downward spiral continues as the number of abandoned buildings rises 
along with crime and vandalism, while prices and government services fall. Finally, the 
neighborhood will be torn down, the residents will be relocated, and the area will be devel-
oped for more affluent families and commercial enterprises. For a more comprehensive and 
detailed examination of the causes and effects of redlining and the various proposed reme-
dies see Duncan, Hood, & Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation and Urban 
Decay; Neighborhood Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 URB. L. 510 (1975); 
Givens, The "Antiredlining" Issue: Can Banks be Forced to Lend?, 95 BANKING L.J. 515 
(1978); Hood, & Weed, Redlining Revisited: A Neighborhood Development Bank as a Pro-
posed Solution, 11 URS. L. 139 (1979); Renne, Eliminating Redlining by Judicial Action: 
Are Erasers Available?, 29 VAND. L. REV. 987 (1976); Searing, Discrimination in Home 
Finance, 48 NOTRE DAME L. 1113 (1973); Van Alstyne, Redlining-The Cure Worse than 
the Illness, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. 264 (1977); Werner, Frej, & Madway, Redlining and Disin-
vestment Causes, Consequences, and Proposed Remedies, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 501 
(1976); Note, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 110 (1976); Note, Redlining: Remedies for Victims of Urban Disinvestment, 5 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 83 (1976); Note, Redlining-The Fight Against Discrimination in Mortgage 
Lending, 6 Loy. CHI. L.J. 71 (1975); Redlining: Should Local Government Become In-
volved?, 10 U.C.D. L. REV. 243 (1977). 
11 For a more complete discussion of the criteria involved in lending decisions, see R. 
SCHAFER, JOINT CENTER FOR URBAN STUDIES OF M.I.T. & HARVARD UNlVERSITY, MORTGAGE 
LENDING DECISIONS ch. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as JOINT STUDY]. 
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dicted by examining the creditworthiness of the applicant and the 
suitability of the property offered as collateral. An evaluation of 
creditworthiness may take into account the applicant's income in 
relation to the size of the loan requested, the applicant's overall 
net wealth and credit history, and the ratio of the size of the loan 
requested to the appraised value of the property. The suitability 
of the property offered as collateral is determined by the general 
condition of the property and other relevant neighborhood char-
acteristics12 believed to affect the future value of the collateral. 
The final decision to grant, deny, or modify13 the application is 
based on all of the above factors viewed collectively.14 
To date, judicial treatment of the redlining controversy has 
been both limited and inadequate. In Laufman v. Oakley Build-
ing and Loan CO.,111 a white married couple brought an action 
under the Fair Housing Act,18 alleging that they had contracted 
to purchase residential property in a racially integrated area, and 
that the defendant had denied their application for a mortgage 
loan on the basis of the racial composition of the neighborhood in 
which the property was located.1'7 The court found that in order 
to "effectuate the purposes of Congress" the Act must be inter-
preted liberally and concluded that a prohibition against redlin-
ing was within the spirit of the Act.1s While the decision serves as 
a useful starting point in addressing the redlining problem, the 
precise dimensions of the prohibition as outlined by the court re-
main unclear. 
One of the major difficulties with Laufman is that the court 
.. See text at note 175, infra. 
18 A decision to modify a particular application may include a reduction in the size of 
the loan, a change in the length of maturity, or an alteration in the cost of the loan (inter-
est rate, closing costs, etc.) . 
.. There is no commonly accepted evaluation of the relative importance of each factor. 
The weight given each individual factor in arriving at a final decision will vary among 
institutions. 
10 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
18 (Title VIII), 42 V.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979) (amended 1978). 
The plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), 42 V.S.C. 
§§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976) (guaranteeing equality in programs or activities receiving 
federal financial assistance). 408 F. Supp. at 498. 
11 See Complaint at 3, Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. 
Ohio 1976). Other cases specifically dealing with redlining and the Fair Housing Act in-
clude Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 414 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ohio 1976); 
Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (insurance 
redlining). 
18 408 F. Supp. at 497. 
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never defined redlining. Hence, it is uncertain whether the court 
was addressing only intentional acts of systematic loan denial, or 
whether the court also contemplated other lending practices 
which have discriminatory results. However, the court's continual 
reference to "racial redlining"18 leaves one with the unsettling im-
pression that the prohibition announced by the court is limited to 
situations where lenders intend to discriminate on the basis of the 
racial composition of the neighborhood.lo This circumscribed defi-
nition of redlining, which requires a showing of discriminatory in-
tent, may well prove inadequate in successfully challenging a 
large number of lending decisions where redlining is alleged. Al-
ternatively, a definition which dispenses with the intent require-
ment would permit a greater number of harmful lending practices 
to be subsumed under the word "redlining" and would focus at-
tention on the discriminatory impact of the lender's conduct 
rather than his motivation. II 
This article will concentrate on one particular mode of judicial 
'8 For example, in discussing congressional amendments to the Fair Housing Act the 
court said: "but Congress did not change the language of this provision [§ 3605] to make 
clear that it did not intend to prohibit racial redlining despite the prior agency determina-
tions that this practice was prohibited by the Act." 408 F. Supp. at 496. At another time, 
the court again drew a connection between individual lending decisions based on race and 
redlining. "Unquestionably, a denial of federal aaaistance to loan applicants on the basis of 
the racial composition of the neighborhood would constitute 'discrimination.' We believe 
that Congress could and did prohibit private sources from engaging in such discrimination 
... ." Id. at 499. 
I. The fact that the court was content to quote extensively from the remarks made by 
counsel for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board further supports the proposition that the 
court was employing a restrictive definition of redlining. 
[T]he gist of what CongreBB was attempting to make illegal in Title VIII and the gist of 
. what the Bank Board was trying to make illegal in its regulations, was the feeling on 
the part of a great many lenders that a racially integrated neighborhood per se must be 
a bad credit risk . . . it's been shown time and again that a neighborhood which had 
changed from white to black or a neighborhood that is racially integrated. . . need not 
be a declining neighborhood. . . . The Board is anxious that lenders not use the racial 
composition of the neighborhood to effect an automatic judgment that it must be 
declining. 
408 F. Supp. at 501. 
"' Indeed, in the MIT-Harvard study, wherein redlining was alleged to occur on the 
basis of location, age of the housing stock, and the racial composition of the neighborhood, 
statistical analysis contradicted allegations of redlining in 22 out of 30 cases while produc-
ing equivocal results in 6 others. 1 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11, at iii to iv. This data 
suggests that other factors may have been responsible for a paucity of loans being granted 
in specific neighborhoods. A more expansive definition of redlining which accoUnts for in-
stances of redlining in effect, would cover a larger number of cases insofar as all lending 
practices having a discriminatory effect would be prohibited where not justified by busi-
neBS necessity. 
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action which could provide relief to victims of mortgage discrimi-
nation. First, an expanded definition of redlining is proposed 
which includes a variety of injurious lending practices not previ-
ously embraced within other definitions. Second, the history and 
provisions of the Fair Housing Actlll are examined to determine 
whether the Act prohibits the types of practices included under 
the proposed definition. A section then bridges the gap between 
the restrictive language of the Act and the broad language of the 
new definition with the introduction of the discriminatory effects 
test. This intermediate section discusses the contours of the test, 
including its applicability under the Act and the general consider-
ations relevant to a plaintiff's presentation of a prima facie case'8 
in a redlining claim. Finally, the business necessity defense under 
the effects test will be discussed, with emphasis upon the particu-
lar justifications which the defendant lending institution may em-
ploy to defeat a plaintiff's prima facie case. 
II. REDLINING: REACHING A SUITABLE DEFINITION 
The complex nature of the lending process requires that ac-
cepted definitions of redlining be re-evaluated to include a 
broader range of potentially harmful lending practices. A recent 
comprehensive study of the subject" provides an illustration of 
an underinclusive definition of redlining: "Redlining is the refusal 
to lend, or the granting of mortgages with less favorable terms, in 
certain geographic areas even though the expected yield and risk 
of loss are the same as they are for mortgages granted in other 
areas."111 This definition is essentially geographically comparative 
in that the existence of redlining is determined by examining 
lending practices within a discrete geographic area and then com-
paring those practices with practices in other areas. Additionally, 
the inclusion of "expected yield" and "risk of loss" parameters 
within the definition provides clues as to possible defenses which 
a lending institution might assert in attempting to justify its 
practices. 
The above definition is deficient insofar as the use of the term 
"refusal" implies that lending institutions must make a conscious 
II Title VIII, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979) (amended 1978). 
la See cases cited at note 62, infra. 
I. See JOINT STUDY, supra note 11. 
I. 1 id. ch. I, at 10. 
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choice not to grant loans in certain geographic areas before red-
lining is established. Likewise, other attempts to define redlining 
also appear to include an intent requirement.26 For example, "ra-
cial redlining" -the term employed in the Lau{man case-refers 
to discrimination in the granting of mortgage credit based on the 
perceived racial characteristics of the neighborhood in which the 
loan applicant wishes to live,27 while "economic redlining" implies 
that lenders categorize certain geographic areas as zones of exces-
sive risk and thus refuse to grant mortgages regardless of the 
characteristics of individual borrowers.28 All of these definitions 
are fatally underinclusive in that they overlook a kind of de 
{acto2S redlining which may exist where loan applications are con-
sidered individually, yet the criteria used in evaluating those ap-
plications result in few loans being granted in specific neighbor-
hoods. This type of practice is equally injurious to those seeking 
mortgage funds and therefore should be prohibited where no le-
gitimate business reason is proven. Given the increasing propen-
sity of courts to look at the, discriminatory effects of conduct in 
actions brought under antidiscrimination legislation,80 such a pro-
hibition is logical notwithstanding the continued requirement of 
demonstrating discriminatory intent in constitutional claims.81 
Hence, any test which is employed for the purpose of curbing 
mortgage discrimination should address cases involving redlining 
in effect as well as those in which an intent to redline is present.81 
With the above considerations in mind, the following definition 
of redlining is the most appropriate: Redlining is the refusal to 
lend (or the granting of mortgages with less favorable terms) in 
certain geographic areas, or the employment of any lending crite-
ria which effectively result in comparatively few loans being 
granted in certain geographic areas, even though the expected 
yield and risk of loss parameters are equivalent to those of mort-
gages granted in other areas . 
•• See Note, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 110, 110 n. 1 (1976). 
27 Id . 
•• Id . 
•• Not to be confused with any constitutional significance given the term "de facto" as 
used in the school desegregation cases listed at note 5, supra. 
•• See cases cited at note 79, infra. 
31 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) . 
•• Unless specifically stated otherwise, the term "redlining" will be used throughout the 
balance of this article to refer to both intentional and unintentional acts of redlining. 
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The introduction of this new definition requires that several 
points be noted. The definition is facially neutral with respect to 
race because it attempts to account for many harmful lending 
practices which are not racially motivated. On the other hand, ac-
tionable mortgage discrimination under the antidiscrimination 
laws only occurs where lending practices have an adverse effect on 
members of a particular race or other protected class. Thus, while 
the definition describes the universe of undesirable lending prac-
tices, only those falling within the scope of appropriate civil rights 
legislation88 will be prohibited. The value of the expanded defini-
tion in protecting those who most need help is not diluted insofar 
as red lining is peculiar to poorer neighborhoods where blacks and 
other minority group members are more likely to reside.8• The 
remaining obstacles are discovering the proper statutory founda-
tion on which to ground a prohibition against redlining and deter-
mining whether such a prohibition requires a showing of discrimi-
natory intent. 
III. THE NEED FOR A STATUTORY BASIS: THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
The redlining problem has triggered a varied legislative re-
sponse at the state and federal levels. 811 Current federal legislation 
requires lending institutions to periodically disclose the geo-
graphic distribution of their mortgage 10ans86 and mandates that 
's E.g., the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619 (West 1977 & Supp. 
1979) (amended 1978) . 
• 4 Without making first-hand observations of some of the older, poorer neighborhoods 
in the nation's larger cities, the conclusion that minority group members tend to live in 
poor neighborhoods can only be drawn by inference. The median income of blacks in the 
United States in 1977 was $9,563 compared to $16,740 for whites. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 449, table no. 735 
(1979). The median income in central cities (50,000 plus inhabitants, id. at 2) where ap-
proximately 58 % of the blacks reside (27 % for whites), id. at 17, table no. 16, was $12,059 
compared with a median income in suburban areas of $16,579, id. at 459, table no. 751, 
where 40% of the white population lives, id. at 17, table no. 16 . 
• 6 For a general examination of redlining legislation and regulation at all levels of gov-
ernment, see Wisniewski, Mortgage Redlining (Disinvestment): The Parameters of Fed-
eral, State, and Municipal Regulation, 54 J. URB. L. 367 (1977). 
S. Periodic disclosure is required under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 2801·2809 (1976). The purpose of the Act is to provide the public with sufficient 
information to enable them to determine whether lending institutions are fulfilling their 
obligation of meeting the housing needs of the communities in which they are located. [d. 
§ 2801. The provisions of the Act are enforced by the Federal Reserve Board and are 
applicable to any depository institution which makes "federally related mortgage loans." 
[d. § 2802. Basically, this includes any institution who is regulated or whose deposits are 
insured by an agency of the federal government, or whose loans are in any way insured, 
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they meet the credit needs of the communities they serve under 
the auspices of the appropriate federal regulatory agencies.37 
Mandatory disclosure can be an effective means of exposing un-
desirable lending practices, but the law's primary weakness is 
that it presumes that depositors will act on such information and 
guaranteed, supplemented, or assisted by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment or by an officer or agency of the federal government. 41 Fed. Reg. 23,936 (1976). 
Briefly, the Act requires lending institutions to keep records of the numbers and dollar 
amount of mortgages originated or purchased by the institution during the fiscal year ac-
cording to census tract or zip code. 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (1976). Regulations promulgated by 
the Federal Reserve Board further delineates the manner and type of data which must be 
disclosed. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 203.1-.6 (1979). The history and provisions of the Act are dis-
cussed in Wisniewski, Mortgage Redlining (Disinvestment): The Parameters of Federal, 
State, a·nd Municipal Regulation, 54 J. URB. L. 367 (1977); Note, An Analysis of the 
Effectiveness of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 28 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 
1074 (1978); Comment, Red-lining and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: A 
Decisive Step Toward Private Urban Re-Development, 25 EMORY L.J. 667 (1976); The 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: Will it Protect Urban Consumers from Redlin-
ing?, 12 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 957 (1977). 
37 The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act is complemented by the Community Reinvellt-
ment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-2905 (West Supp. 1979), which requires federal 
regulatory agencies to "encourage" lending institutions to help meet the credit needs of 
local communities "consistent with the safe and sound operations of such institutions." [d. 
§ 290l(b). Regulatory agencies must assess the institution's efforts to address local credit 
needs whenever that institution has filed an application with the agency for a charter, 
deposit insurance, establishment of a domestic branch, relocation of a home office, or a 
merger or acquisition. [d. § 2902(3). Regulations passed by the various agencies require the 
periodic filing of a Community Reinvestment Act statement which contains information 
similar to that required under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and which includes the 
institution's own statement of its efforts to meet the communities' needs. See, e.g., 12 
C.F.R. § 563e.4 (1979). The agency will then use that information in deciding whether to 
approve or deny the institution's application. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2903(2) (West Supp. 1979). 
The Community Reinvestment Act regulations are discussed in Note, The Community 
Reinvestment Act Regulations: Another Attempt to Control Redlining, 28 CATH. U.L. 
REV. 635 (1979). 
Banks and other lending institutions in the United States may be08ubject to state regu-
lation, but most are also subject to regulation by at least one of four federal regulatory 
agencies. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) regulates all federally-chartered 
savings and loan associations and also those state-chartered savings and loan associations 
that insure deposits with the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation. 12 U.S.C. §§ 
1437, 1725, 1726 (1976). National banks receive their charters and must report to the 
Comptroller of the Currency (COC). 12 U.S.C. §§ 26, 161 (1976). The Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB) supervises each Federal Reserve Bank and each national or state bank which 
is a member of the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. §§ 221, 248(a), (j) (1976). State-chartered 
insured banks and savings banks who are not members of the Federal Reserve System 
report to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813, 1817 
(1976). 
Regulations promulgated by the various agencies under the Community Reinvestment 
Act are contained in: 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.1-.8 (1979) (COC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.1-.8 (1979) 
(FRB); 12 C.F.R. §§ 345.1-.8 (1979) (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 563e.l-.8 (1979) (FHLBB). 
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channel their savings away from offending institutions.3s In addi-
tion to requiring disclosure, state legislation enacted to date often 
contains an explicit prohibition against redlining.39 Such legisla-
tion is the most direct and potentially most effective means of 
combating redlining, but it too may suffer where a narrow con-
cept of redlining has been employed.40 Furthermore, given the 
limited applicability of state statutes, existing federal civil rights 
legislation poses an attractive alternative in providing a broadly-
based prohibition against mortgage discrimination" l 
aa Obviously such disclosure laws will only be effective if depositors are well-informed 
and well-organized. While this may be too much to expect from the public in general, it 
would appear to be a particularly serious problem in poorer communities where depositors 
are likely to be less educated. Although the legislative history is silent on this point, the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) may have been a response to the need for a disclo-
sure statute with teeth insofar as it requires institutions to demonstrate that they are 
meeting the credit needs of local communities, and permits the supervising agency to use 
such information when it acts upon applications for charters, branch offices, etc. The 
weakness of the CRA may be that it seems to provide for the imposition of sanctions only 
in the event that the institution has an application pending with the agency and thus does 
not necessarily provide immediate relief for those individuals who are adversely affected 
by the bank's practices. 
a. See, e.g., the Financial Institutions Disclosure Act, ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 95, §§ 201-208 
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979); the Illinois Fairness in Lending Act, ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 
95, §§ 301-307 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979) (anti-redlining); MICH. STATS. ANN. §§ 
23.1125(1)-.1125(14) (Callaghan Cum. Supp. 1979) (disclosure and anti-redlining), dis-
cussed in Comment, Michigan's Redlining Law, 1978 DET. C.L. REV. 599. California's dis-
closure and anti-redlining regulations are examined in Comment, Redlining in Mortgage 
Lending; California's Approach to Getting the Red Out, 8 PAC. L.J. 699 (1977). 
•• For example, under the Michigan statute lenders are prohibited from discriminating 
due to the racial or ethnic characteristics of the neighborhood, the age of the structure 
proposed as security for the mortgage, or the age of adjoining structures. MICH. STATS. 
ANN. § 23.1125(2) (Callaghan Cum. Supp. 1979). Although the Act additionally requires 
that lending criteria be applied uniformly and loan applications be considered individu-
ally, id., the enumeration of race and age of the housing as the only prohibited criteria 
raises the possibility that other harmful lending criteria will be ignored if applied on a 
uniform basis. It also implies that lending decisions are actually made on the basis of race 
or the location of the property alone. The Illinois statute likewise frames the prohibition 
narrowly by focusing on the location of the property, but the Act also prohibits the em-
ployment of any lending criteria which have a discriminatory effect. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 
95, § 304 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979). Thus, it is the inclusion of the discriminatory 
effects test in the Illinois statute which enables it to reach a wide variety of harmful lend-
ing practices and thereby avoid any implication that there must be a showing that the 
lender consciously chose to discriminate on the basis of race, or that he explicitly decided 
not to lend in a particular neighborhood . 
• , It is not suggested that the specific anti-redlining legislation outlined above is useless 
and that the best or only way to proceed is via the civil rights legislation. Use of the 
antidiscrimination laws contains a significant limitation for as one commentator explained: 
"suits under the several Civil Rights Acts provide a valuable and flexible tool for eliminat-
ing arbitrary racial redlining but cannot cure arbitrary redlining based upon factors unre-
1979] REDLINING 367 
While none of the current antidiscrimination statutes·2 specifi-
cally prohibits redlining, the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII)·s most 
closely addresses the kind of conduct complained of in a redlining 
case. The purpose of the Act is to provide fair housing, within 
constitutional limitations, throughout the United States!· The 
factors which led to the passage of the Act further illuminate its 
purpose. During a period when rioting and civil disturbances were 
commonplace in many major cities across the country,U Congress 
recognized the "discontent of people trapped in the nation's ghet-
toes."·s While a high percentage of the non-white population 
lived in urban areas, most new factories and stores were located 
in suburban areas outside the reach of non-whites, thereby ac-
counting for the high incidence of unemployment in the cities!' 
Indeed, studies showed that many black families who could other-
wise afford to move from old urban areas were effectively ex-
cluded from predominantly white suburbs!S Congress believed 
that a fair housing law would solve many of these problems!e 
The Fair Housing Act prohibits, inter alia, discrimination in 
the sale or rental of housingliO and in the extension of financial 
lated to race or racial transition." Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U. 
L. REV. 989, 1013 (1976) (emphasis supplied). Challenging redlining through the antidis-
crimination laws is advocated in this article because it is existing legislation applicable on 
a national scale which should reach a large number of instances where redlining is alleged. 
See note 34, supra. State legislation such as the Illinois statute may also prove to be an 
effective weapon against redlining where the principles of the discriminatory effects test 
have been employed. 
•• See statutes listed at note 52, infra . 
.. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979) (amended 1978) . 
•• 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976) . 
•• The Act was passed in 1968, with many riots having occurred during the summer of 
1967 . 
•• Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 496 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (dis-
cussing the legislative history of the Act). See also Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative 
History and Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Dubofsky); 
Note, The Federal Fair Housing Requirements: Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 
1969 DUKE L.J. 733. 
47 Dubofsky, supra note 46, at 153 . 
•• THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 244 (1968), cited in 
Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 496 (S.D. Ohio 1976) . 
•• Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 497 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
•• Section 804 of the Act provides: 
[I)t shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to 
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to 
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale 
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assistance for housing. III Like other antidiscrimination statutes, 
the language of the Act only prohibits discrimination "because of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."111 If this narrow lan-
guage is read literally and applied to redlining, then the statute 
would only apply in the limited number of cases where the deci-
sion not to lend was based on a discriminatory intent, and the 
plaintiff would have the difficult and often insurmountable task 
of proving such an intent. 113 
or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection there-
with, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any no-
tice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that 
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or 
discrimination. 
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling 
is in fact so available. 
(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling 
by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a 
person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976) . 
.. Section 805 states: 
[lIt shall be unlawful for any bank, building and loan association, insurance company 
or other corporation, association, firm or enterprise whose business consists in whole or 
in part in the making of commercial real estate loans, to deny a loan or other financial 
assistance to a person applying therefor for the purpose of purchasing, constructing, 
improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling, or to discriminate against him in the 
fixing of the amount, interest rate, duration, or other terms or conditions of such loan 
or other financial assistance, because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
of such person or of any person associated with him in connection with such loan or 
other financial assistance or the purposes of such loan or other financial assistance, or 
of the present or prospective owners, lessees, tenants, or occupants of the dwelling or 
dwellings in relation to which such loan or other financial assistance is to be made or 
given: Provided, That nothing contained in this section shall impair the scope or effec-
tiveness of the exception contained in section 3603(b) of this title. 
42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976) . 
•• Examples of this general language are found in: 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b) (1976) (see 
note 50, supra); 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976) (see note 51, supra); the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title 11), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1976) (public accomodations); the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Title VI), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976) (federally assisted programs); 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976) (equal 
employment). Some antidiscrimination statutes do not mention race at all, but rather, are 
framed in terms of equal rights for all citizens, e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1982 (1976) (guarantee of equal property rights); the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1691 (1976) . 
•• The problems inherent in literally applying the language of the Fair Housing Act to 
include a requirement of proving discriminatory intent was noted in Resident Advisory 
Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978), where the 
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Whether the provisions of the Act ban only intentional redlin-
ing cannot be divined from the statutory language alone, and the 
legislative history of the Act is silent with respect to the scope of 
its prohibitions. Arguably, the sweeping concerns of Congress out-
lined above dictate that the Act be construed broadly to include 
redlining and that the intent requirement be dispensed with in 
order to eliminate the greatest number of discriminatory housing 
practices. However, two federal district courts that have endorsed 
a liberal reading of the discrimination provisions of the Act to 
include a prohibition against redlining also appear to have re-
quired a showing of discriminatory intent:'• 
IV. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT TO 
REDLINING 
Historically, in claims of discrimination based on constitutional 
grounds, courts have frequently required some demonstration of 
discriminatory purpose.1I1I For example, in the area of school de-
segregation the Supreme Court has held that proof of discrimina-
court stated: 
Looking to [the Actj itself, we note that the "because of race" language might seem to 
suggest that a plaintiff must show some measure of discriminatory intent. To so con-
strue [the Actj,however, would have the effect of increasing the plaintiffs' burden in 
proving a prima facie Title VIII case .... We would be most reluctant to sustain such 
a requirement. 
[d. at 146-47. This portion of the decision is discussed in 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 615, 625 
(1978) . 
•• See Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (plain-
tiffs stated a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act where they claimed that they 
were denied a mortgage loan solely on the basis of the racial composition of the neighbor-
hood); Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 414 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Ohio 1976) 
(the Fair Housing Act only requires that mortgage loans be denied because of racial con-
siderations and therefore, the loan applicant may be white). But see Dunn v. Midwestern 
Indemnity Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979), where the court in an action under the 
Fair Housing Act held that "a discriminatory failure or refusal to provide property insur-
ance on dwellings" violated § 3604 of the Act. [d. at 1109. Use of the term "failure" im-
plies that plaintiff need not demonstrate a discriminatory intent, although this interpreta-
tion is clouded somewhat by the court's earlier definition of "insurance redlining": "[fjor 
purposes of this motion, insurance redlining is defined as the restriction of insurance 
based on the racial composition of the neighborhood, apart from any consideration of 
risk." [d. at 1107 n.3. Thus, it appears that the court employed a narrow definition of 
redlining with the result that plaintiff would be required to offer some evidence indicating 
that the defendant refused to provide insurance on the basis of the racial composition of 
the neighborhood . 
•• This requirement was made explicit in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), 
discussed in text at notes 73-78, infra. 
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tory purpose was needed to establish de jure segregation. liS Simi-
larly, the language of the antidiscrimination statutesll7 implies a 
requirement of discriminatory purpose or intent. In order to 
bridge the gap between the proposed definition of redlining and 
the restrictive language of the Fair Housing Act, the remainder of 
this article will focus on the proposed use of the discriminatory 
effects test, as developed in employment discrimination cases, in 
claims of red lining brought under the Fair Housing Act. IIS 
The discriminatory effects test was first articulated in cases 
brought under Title VII, the civil rights legislation governing 
equal employment.1I9 Indeed, to date the test has been most 
widely applied and refined under statutory claims in the employ-
ment field. so However, courts have begun to recognize the adapta-
bility of the test to other fields of civil rights legislation including 
Title VIII, the Fair Housing Act.s1 
•• See Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). For examples of other cases 
where a showing of discriminatory purpose was required, see Comment, Proof of Racially 
Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Ar-
lington Heights, Mt. Healthy & Williamsburgh, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 725, 730 n.28 
(1977). Interestingly, lower courts have apparently adopted several methods for establish-
ing the existence of discriminatory purpose, some of which permit a defense similar to the 
business necessity defense found in Title VII actions. For a discussion of these approaches, 
see id. at 731-37 . 
.. See note 52, supra . 
•• 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979) (amended 1978) . 
•• Specifically, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 
(1976). See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) . 
• 0 The effects test enjoyed only limited success in cases brought on constitutional 
grounds. E.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Castro v. 
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist. 
484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973); Walston v. County School Bd. of Nansemond County, 492 
F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974); Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist. 325 F. 
Supp. 560 (N.D. Miss. 1971), modified, 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972). But cf. Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), discussed in text at notes 73-78, infra, where the Court explic-
itly denied application of the effects test in a claim brought under the Fifth Amendment . 
• , See cases cited at note 79, infra. Reasons why the effects test has not ·enjoyed wider 
popularity in Title VIII litigation to date and the rationale for employing the test under 
Title VIII has been cogently stated by one commentator: 
Title VII law has been substantially refined with respect to such matters as the ele-
ments of a prima facie case, the proper use of statistical evidence, and the proof neces-
sary to establish discriminatory effect and the business necessity defense, whereas no 
comparable Supreme Court guidance exists concerning the substantive requirements of 
the Fair Housing Act. 
The fact that different issues have become prominent under Title VII and Title VIII 
is, of course, not a reason to limit Griggs [discussed in text at notes 66-72, infra] to the 
employment discrimination field. Rather, it simply demonstrates the greater concern 
the Supreme Court has shown for Title VII cases and, correspondingly, the growing 
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In any claim brought under the Fair Housing Act, the plaintiff 
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination in order to 
avoid a directed verdict. S2 The elements of a prima facie redlining 
case are closely related and not always separable. The current dis-
criminatory effects test as applied to redlining comprises a statis-
tical demonstration that the defendant's conduct has a discrimi-
natory effect through: 1) a showing that the class affected by the 
discriminatory conduct is one which is protected under the Act; 
and 2) evidence showing that the plaintiffs are qualified to receive 
the mortgage funds that they were denied.s3 Insofar as the plain-
need for a definitive statement by the Court concerning the meaning of the Fair Hous-
ing Act. 
When that statement does come, the analogy of Griggs and Title VII should prove 
compelling: the "because of race" language is similar in both laws; ... the related 
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 are similarly construed in the employment 
and housing fields; the Fair Housing Act, like Title VII, is a remedial civil rights stat-
ute and as such is entitled to a "generous construction"; none of the differences be-
tween employment and housing justify a fundamental difference in the interpretation 
of the two statutes; and finally, and most importantly, the congressional desire to erad-
icate the consequences of discrimination, not simply the motivation behind it, is just as 
strong under Title VIII as it is under Title VII. Thus, the Fair Housing Act should also 
be held to proscribe "not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in 
form, but discriminatory in operation." 
Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 NOTRE DAME L. 199,237-
38 (1978) (emphasis in original). For another viewpoint supporting the transferability of 
Title VII principles to Title VIII, see Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case 
to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 128 (1976). 
Regulations promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board partially in response 
to the policies announced in the Fair Housing Act, lends further support for the viability 
of the effects test in Title VIII claims. While some of the Board's regulations parrot the 
language found in the Act, others specifically address the redlining problem: 
The basic purpose of the Board's nondiscrimination regulations is to require that every 
applicant be given an equal opportunity to obtain a loan. Each loan applicant's credit 
worthiness should be evaluated on an individual basis without reference to presumed 
characteristics of a group. The use of lending standards which have no economic basis 
and which are discriminatory in effect is a violation of law even in the absence of an 
actual intent to discriminate. However, a standard which has a discriminatory effect is 
not necessarily improper if its use achieves a genuine business need which cannot be 
achieved by means which are not discriminatory in effect or less discriminatory in 
effect. 
12 C.F.R. § 531.8(b) (1979) (emphasis supplied) . 
•• See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1021 (1974); United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976); 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) . 
•• The elements of this test are derived generally from Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424 (1971), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
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tiff is attempting to prove discrimination indirectly (i.e. without 
evidence of discriminatory intent), the defendant may rebut the 
plaintiff's prima facie case by claiming that his actions were justi-
fied by business necessity.84 This defense is not available where 
the plaintiff presents evidence proving actual discriminatory 
intent. Iii 
A. Presence of Discrimination: Discriminatory Effect 
The concept of a discriminatory effects test was first fully in-
troduced in Griggs v. Duke Power CO.II In that case, black em-
ployees brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,67 challenging an employer's requirement that employees 
pass a series of intelligence tests or possess a high school diploma 
before being admitted to certain job classifications .. The plaintiffs 
claimed that where the requirements were unrelated to job per-
formance and operated to disqualify blacks at a substantially 
higher rate than whites,18 the requirements were racially discrimi-
natory and violated Title VII. The Supreme Court agreed. 
Reversing a court of appeals determination that absent a show-
ing of discriminatory purpose Title VII had not been violated, the 
•• See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) . 
•• In one Title VII case the Fourth Circuit stated: "In some instances the reasons for 
taking particular action may determine whether the action is unlawfully discriminatory. 
However, if a respondent's actions are otherwise determined to constitute an unlawful em-
ployment practice, the existence of a business purpose for continuing the practice will not 
negate its illegality." Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. 
dismissed under Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). Along these same lines one commentator 
added: "Congress clearly proscribed the explicit use of race as an employment qualifica-
tion, and therefore even 'business necessity' cannot justify an employment practice's overt 
reliance on racial classification." Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 107 (1974) (referring to 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976), which allows sex, religion, and national origin, but does not 
allow race or color to be used as a bona fide occupational qualification) . 
•• 401 U.S. 424 (1971). While Griggs was the first case to explicitly layout the full ef-
fects test, prior cases provided clues as to the eventual development of the test. See Local 
189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123 (8th 
Cir. 1969); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971) . 
• 7 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976) . 
•• According to a 1960 North Carolina census, 34% of the white male population had 
completed high school compared to 12% of the black male population. Similarly the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission had determined that in one case, the tests used by 
the employer had a pass rate of 58% for whites and only 6% for blacks. 401 U.S. at 430 
n.6. 
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Supreme Court looked to the purpose of the statute, focusing on 
the congressional desire to achieve equality in employment oppor-
tunities through the removal of artificial barriers that had oper-
ated to discriminate on the basis of race or other impermissible 
classifications.69 Thus, "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on 
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be main-
tained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discrimi-
natory employment practices."7o With respect to employment 
practices which are facially neutral yet discriminatory in effect, 
the employer must demonstrate that the practice is mandated by 
business necessity, i.e. a practice which has a discriminatory ef-
fect will be prohibited if not sufficiently related to job perform-
ance.71 In Griggs, the Court concluded that the employer had 
failed to discharge this burden where evidence showed that those 
employees who had not been subject to the requirement contin-
ued to perform their jobs satisfactorally in the departments where 
the requirements were now imposed.72 
Griggs represents an important step towards effectively com-
bating the redlining problem in that it provides a foundation for 
challenging practices having a disproportionate adverse impact on 
a protected class without the necessity of proving discriminatory 
purpose or intent. As is the case in redlining, the employment 
practice in Griggs did not directly involve discrimination on the 
basis of a prohibited classification. Thus, the discriminatory ef-
fects test essentially permits, through a showing of disproportion-
ate impact, a re-characterization of the particular form of dis-
crimination involved from a benign to a prohibited act, when the 
act has the effect of discriminating on a prohibited basis. 
The application of the discriminatory effects test is not permis-
sible in all claims of discrimination. For example, in Washington 
v. Davis7s employment tests which were alleged to have a dispa-
rate impact on blacks were challenged under the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Supreme Court found 
the effects test to be inappropriate. Holding that the court of ap-
peals erred in resolving the Fifth Amendment issue by applying 
standards applicable to Title VII cases, the Supreme Court stated 
•• [d. at 431. 
70 [d. at 430. 
71 [d. at 431. 
.. [d. 
73 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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that even though the Fifth Amendment was designed to curb offi-
cial acts which discriminated on the basis of race, such an official 
act had never been found unconstitutional solely on the basis of 
racially disproportionate impact.'· 
Constitutional claims of discrimination have been subject to 
the tests of either "strict scrutiny" or "minimum rationality."711 
The former test is applied whenever racial or other inherently 
suspect classifications are involved and requires the state to jus-
tify those classifications through a demonstration of a compelling 
state interest. The latter test is employed in all other cases and 
merely requires the classification to be rationally related to the 
legislative goal. 76 Insofar as the former test presents a hurdle 
which is extremely difficult to overcome while the latter practi-
cally accords the legislature unbridled discretion, the choice of 
test is crucial. 
The Court in Davis focused on the degree to which evidence of 
disproportionate impact would influence the choice of test. In 
reaching its result, the Court did not explicitly state that a dis-
criminatory purpose must appear on the face of the act or that 
evidence of disproportionate impact was irrelevant." Rather, the 
Court indicated that one may draw an inference of discriminatory 
purpose from a showing of disproportionate impact, but that fact 
alone would not trigger the rule that classifications on the basis of 
race be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.78 The limitation on the 
use of the effects test and the resulting need to prove intent in 
constitutional cases thus requires that claims of redlining be 
grounded on a statutory rather than a constitutional foundation. 
The extent to which the effects test has been utilized in cases 
arising under the Fair Housing Act is difficult to measure, per-
haps in part due to the wide variety of fact patterns in these 
types of cases.79 However, logic would dictate that the rationale 
.. [d. at 239. 
70 See cases cited at note 3, supra. 
,. This method of analysis was succinctly summarized in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 
427 U.S. 297 (1976): "Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is 
drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions 
presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the 
classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest." [d. at 303. 
11 426 U.S. at 242. 
,. [d. 
1. See Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) (exclusionary zoning); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 
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outlined by the Griggs court for employing the effects test in Ti-
tle VII litigation80 would apply with equal force when considering 
the applicability of the effects test under Title VIII. In Griggs, 
the Court found that the broad purpose of Title VII required a 
concomitantly expansive test for detecting discriminatory conduct 
in employment. Use of the effects test should also be mandated in 
Title VIII cases in order to implement the comprehensive con-
gressional goals in the housing field.81 
Cases decided under Title VIII in recent years indicate an in-
creasing willingness on the part of the courts to adopt an effect-
oriented approach to housing discrimination. Thus, where a de-
veloper's practice of only selling to "approved" builders was chal-
lenged, the Eighth Circuit declared that practices which resulted 
in racial discrimination would be prohibited regardless of the de-
fendant's motivation.82 Further, evidence of a disparate impact on 
blacks along with a showing that the party was otherwise quali-
fied to rent defendant's apartment was held sufficient to establish 
a prima facie inference of discrimination.88 
In Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Ar-
lington Heights,8. the Seventh Circuit found that at least under 
certain circumstances a violation of § 3604 of the Fair Housing 
Act86 could be established through a showing of discriminatory 
effect without also establishing intent.88 The court was unwilling 
to say, however, that all showings of discriminatory effect would 
constitute a per se violation of the Act, as such an interpretation 
would go beyond the intent of Congress.87 Several critical factors 
were outlined by the court as being determinative of whether § 
(8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974) (refusal to sell); Citizens Comm. for 
Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975) 
(public housing). For a discussion of some of these cases and of the effects test in general 
see Hsia, The Effects Test: New Directions, 17 SANTA CLARA L. 777 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as Hsia). 
•• See text at notes 69-70, supra . 
• , Indeed, parallels between the two Acts in terms of their broad congressional purposes 
have already been drawn by the judiciary. See Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 
v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977) . 
•• Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1021 (1974) . 
• a Id . 
.. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) . 
•• 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979) (amended 1978). The text of § 
3604 appears at note 50, supra . 
•• 558 F.2d at 1290 . 
• 7Id. 
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3604 had been violated. Important points in the court's test are 
the strength of the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effects,·· 
and the presentation of some evidence of discriminatory intent.·· 
Evidence of intent need not meet the evidentiary test set forth in 
Davis,·o and the court actually minimized the importance of the 
intent component,·l indicating that a showing of discriminatory 
intent was only one factor to be weighed in determining whether 
the Fair Housing Act had been violated. Presumably, this balanc-
ing process operates on a sliding scale-evidence of other factors 
becomes less important to the plaintiff's case as the showing of 
discriminatory effect becomes stronger. 
The precise contours of the effects test as applied under Title 
VIII remain as yet undefined. Arlington Heights suggests, as does 
its subsequent endorsement in dicta by the Third Circuit,·· that a 
discriminatory effects test roughly analagous to the test applied 
in Title VII cases will also be appropriate in Title VIII claims.·8 
In sum, unlike Laufman v. Oakley Building and Loan Co.," 
where allegations of redlining focused solely on the racial compo-
sition of the neighborhood as the motivation for refusing to lend, 
use of the effects test under Title VIII would not require that a 
plaintiff demonstrate any motivation for the discriminatory prac-
tice-the plaintiff would not even need to show that the defen-
•• Two varieties of discriminatory effects are possible. In one instance a decision or 
practice has a greater impact on one racial group than on another. In the second case the 
decision perpetuates segregation and thus has an undesirable effect on the community as a 
whole. Id. Discriminatory effectS are not lessened even though a particular decision or 
practice may affect white people as well. Id. at 1291. Both types of discriminatory effects 
have potential applicability to the redlining situation . 
•• Id. at 1290. Two other criteria to be examined in a § 3604 action are the defendant's 
interest in taking the action complained of, and whether the plaintiff sought to compel the 
defendant to affirmatively provide housing for members of minority groups or whether the 
plaintiff merely wanted to restrain the defendant from interfering with individual property 
owners who wished to provide such housing. Id. The court discussed the first criterion in 
the context of a disputed action by a governmental body, presumably in the public inter-
est. This case is to be distinguished from one where an individual is seeking to protect 
private rights, in which case the courts would more likely intervene to end the discrimina-
tory conduct. 
··Id. 
Ol Indeed, the court concluded that partial reliance on discriminatory intent involved 
the same problems of proof as when intent is the sole requirement. Id. at 1292. 
'" See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 
U.S. 908 (1978) . 
•• See Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128 (1976) . 
.. 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
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dant actually adopted a policy of not lending in specified areas. 
Under an effect-oriented approach, in order to establish a prima 
facie case the plaintiff would only have to show that the lending 
criteria used by an institution result in few mortgage loans being 
granted in a specific geographic area and that the use of such cri-
teria has a disproportionate impact on a protected class. Thus, 
the plaintiff would not be required to identify the particular lend-
ing criterion which is responsible for the adverse impact to satisfy 
the prima facie requirement. If courts were to adopt the effects 
test in redlining claims rather than requiring evidence of discrim-
inatory intent, the plaintiff would only be required to build a sta-
tistical case showing a pattern of loan denial. This in turn creates 
an inference that the criteria employed by the lending institution 
are responsible for the discriminatory pattern.811 
The essence of the effects test is that it substitutes a showing of 
discriminatory effect for a showing of discriminatory intent. Be-
cause the test allows recovery based solely on evidence of indirect 
discrimination, the standard of proof necessary to satisfy the 
prima facie requirement is necessarily more rigid than it would be 
in a direct discrimination case. For this reason, the plaintiff in 
order to state a prima facie case in an action based on the effects 
test is required to designate the proper class disproportionately 
affected by the conduct and to demonstrate that the class was 
sufficiently qualified for that which they were denied. The busi-
ness necessity defense provides an opportunity for the defendant 
to justify conduct having discriminatory effects, while no such 
justification would be permitted had plaintiff presented evidence 
of intentional discrimination.88 
B. Class Affected 
The discriminatory effects test focuses on a showing that a par-
•• This standard would seem to be less than the requirement enunciated in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), namely, that the plaintiff must offer evidence 
which would permit the drawing of an inference of discriminatory purpose. Here, the in-
ference is more one of causation than one of discriminatory intent. McDonnell Douglas, 
however, involved a case of disparate treatment (rather than disparate impact) which re-
quires proof of intent and only allows evidence of discriminatory effect in satisfying the 
prima facie requirement of presenting evidence of discriminatory purpose. Thus, in dispa-
rate treatment cases, discriminatory effect per se is not prohibited, rather, one must meet 
the more difficult standard of showing intent. See Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and 
the Fair Housing Act, 54 NOTRE DAME L. 199, 213 (1978). 
.. See note 65, supra. 
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ticular practice has a disproportionate impact on a protected 
class.97 The method by which discriminatory impact is calculated 
is therefore of critical importance. 
In Title VII actions, three basic measures of disproportionate 
impact have been used to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of present-
ing a prima facie case.98 The foundation in an employment dis-
crimination case under Title VII is established where: 1) blacks as 
a class (or at least blacks in a specified area) would have been 
excluded by the employment practice in question at a substan-
tially higher rate than whites;" 2) evidence reveals the number of 
black and white job applicants actually excluded by the ,prac-
tice;loo and 3) evidence shows the percentage of blacks employed 
by the defendant and the percentage of blacks residing in the ge-
ographic area are significantly different.lol It should be noted that 
since the issue in Title VII actions is whether the employment 
practice in question excludes members of a protected class at sig-
nificantly higher rates than others, any test must measure the ef-
fect of the practice on both classes separately. 101 
The variety of claims arising under Title VIII suggests that no 
simple formula for measuring disproportionate impact will auto-
matically apply in all cases. loa Because an actionable redlining 
.. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) . 
•• Both Title VII and Title VIII prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, thereby 
making racial minority groups a protected class. In the interests of clarity and ease of 
presentation, the following examples of the basic measures of disproportionate impact use 
blacks as the protected class . 
•• In Griggs, it was shown that different percentages of blacks and whites in North Car-
olina failed to finish high school. See note 68, supra. 
100 The Griggs decision cited statistics showing the number of blacks and whites who 
actually failed the employment tests. See note 68, supra. 
101 A fuller summary of the above evidentiary requirements complete with examples of 
where those requirements have been employed appears in Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 
F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1975). 
102 [d. at 1295. In Green, the court found that the employer's practice of barring em-
ployment to anyone convicted of a crime other than a minor traffic offense excluded 5.3 % 
of the black applicants while only excluding 2.2 % of the white applicants. The court con-
cluded that the practice excluded blacks at a substantially higher rate than whites, and 
plaintiffs thus established a prima facie case of discrimination. Hence, the court rejected 
the claim of de minimis discriminatory effect where it was argued that the percentage of 
blacks rejected compared to the total applicant pool (2.05%) was significantly less than 
the percentage of blacks residing in the St. Louis area (16%). [d. at 1294-95. 
103 See, e.g., Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 1021 (1974) (disproportionate impact may exist where statistics show that all of a 
substantial number of lots have only been sold to whites). In a more complex factual case, 
the court in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 
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claim under Title VIII requires the existence of unlawful discrim-
inatory effects against a protected class in a specific location, the 
plaintiff must specify the geographic area which has been red-
lined, and he must adopt a yardstick for measuring disproportion-
ate impact. This yardstick requirement poses some potential 
problems, illustrating that a direct application of the methods 
used in Title VII casesl04 may not always be appropriate in a red-
lining claim under Title VIII. For example, a comparison between 
the percentage of mortgage loans granted to blacks by Bank A 
and the percentage of blacks residing in a community served by 
Bank A is a poor measure of disproportionate impact because it 
ignores financial criteria which may, under some circumstances, 
warrant the institution's denial of a mortgage loan.loll Likewise, a 
comparison between the number of blacks and whites which 
would have been excludedlo8 by a particular practice may be im-
possible insofar as the plaintiff may have no actual knowledge of 
the lending criteria employed by the defendant.lo7 Finally, while a 
comparison of loan denial rates between whites and blacks pro-
vides the most objective measure of disproportionate impact, de-
ciding which statistics will adequately demonstrate a disparity in 
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), suggested two primary measures of discriminatory effect. See 
note 88, supra. For another approach, compare the method adopted in Arlington Heights 
with that used in Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976), modi-
fied, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). 
,.< See text at notes 98-101, supra. 
,.. Indeed, if the blacks in a neighborhood alleged to have been redlined only comprise a 
small percentage of the black population in a larger geographic area, it might be argued 
that the disproportionate impact was significantly lessened. The argument loses much of 
its strength however, in light of Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975), 
where the court suggested that a comparison between the number of blacks affected by the 
practice and the total black population in a geographic area is an improper method of 
measuring discriminatory effect. See note 102, supra. 
'08 This could be done for example, by comparing the income levels of all blacks and 
whites in an area served by the defendant if income level was one factor which was sus-
pected of excluding a large number of blacks. 
'07 Compare the situation in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), where the 
plaintiffs knew that they were being denied employment specifically because they could 
not pass a test or meet a minimum education requirement. In a redlining case, the plaintiff 
may not know the specific reasons for the loan denial other than that he failed to satisfy 
the institution's lending criteria. This problem appears to have been accounted for in the 
Michigan redlining law. Under that statute, rejected loan applicants have a right to have 
the lending institution produce a written statement outlining the reasons why the loan has 
been rejected. MICH. STATS. ANN. § 23.1125(5) (Callaghan Cum. Supp. 1979). The effective-
ness of such a requirement, however, will be a function of how much detail banks will 
actually be required to furnish. 
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loan denial rates may present its own difficulties. 
An actionable redlining claim requires that loan denial rates be 
compared on a neighborhood-wide basis, and hence the size of the 
particular geographic areas to be compared is of crucial impor-
tance. Secondly, Griggs involved a case where blacks were re-
jected in "substantially higher" numbers than whites. lOS This im-
plies that it may be necessary to show that the neighborhood 
alleged to have been redlined is predominantly inhabited by 
members of a protected class and that the neighborhood denial 
rate is "substantially higher" than in the non-redlined neighbor-
hood. lo9 Unfortunately, the courts have provided little guidance 
in this area, and therefore the precise level of disproportionate 
impact which will be legally sufficient to sustain a redlining claim 
will have to be resolved on a case by case basis.llo 
'.8 401 u.s. 424, 426. (1970). Again, there is no logical reason why the standards im-
posed in Title VII cases should not apply as well to Title VIII claims. See note 61, supra. 
'00 If neighborhood X is 85% black and only 2% of its mortgage requests are granted, 
while neighborhood Y is 85% white with 80% of its mortgage requests being granted, a 
fairly clear case of disproportionate impact can be established assuming both neighbor-
hood's risk parameters are roughly equivalent. However, if neighborhood X is 60% black 
with only 40% of its mortgage requests being granted while neighborhood Y is 60% white 
with 60% of its mortgage requests being granted, a much closer case is established insofar 
as these statistics alone do not reveal what percentage of blacks in each of the respective 
neighborhoods were granted mortgages. In this second case, it is possible that no blacks 
received any mortgages or that-assuming each neighborhood is the same size-an equal 
number of blacks from each neighborhood received mortgages. Thus, while actionable red-
lining requires that comparisons be made on a neighborhood-wide basis, the percentage of 
blacks receiving mortgages in each of the neighborhoods cannot be ignored. 
The problem of choosing the proper statistics to demonstrate disproportionate impact 
exists in the employment field as well where geography and skills of the comparison group 
are critical factors. See Comment, Statistics and Title VII Proof: Prima Facie Case and 
Rebuttal, 15 Hous. L. REV. 1030 (1978). For example, in Hazelwood School Dist. v. United 
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), the size of the geographic area from which the comparison 
group was drawn determined whether or not the plaintiff had established a prima facie 
case. [d. at 310-13. Hazlewood is discussed at some length in Note, The Role of Statistical 
Evidence in Title VII Cases, 19 B.C. L. REV. 881 (1978). For a general discussion of the 
problem of statistical proof, see Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Dis-
crimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. REV. 387 (1975). 
11. A more difficult problem arises when the racial composition of the neighborhood is in 
the process of changing. It is commonly believed that lending institutions redline areas 
into which many blacks are moving because this movement is interpreted as an indication 
that the neighborhood is declining. Indeed, this appeared to be one of the concerns of the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board as reflected in its regulations. See notes 20 & 61, supra. 
Thus, under the effects test, it would seem that in a "changing" neighborhood, one would 
not have a claim until the neighborhood reached a stage where it was "predominantly" 
black, unless plaintiff had some evidence linking the changing characteristic of the neigh-
borhood with the fact that it was being redlined. 
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c. Qualification of Plaintiffs 
Implicit in the demonstration of disproportionate impact is a 
showing that those who are discriminated against are qualified for 
that which they are being denied. The Court in Griggs cautioned 
that the opinion should not be read as prohibiting all job-related 
testing which results in a lower pass ratio among minorities.lll 
Indeed, the purpose of Title VII was to ensure that persons were 
hired on the basis of their qualifications rather than their race.l12 
Hence, the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case must 
show that the defendant's employment practices had the effect of 
discriminating against otherwise qualified applicants. Absent 
some evidence of qualification, a mere statistical showing that few 
blacks are hired will probably be insufficient.118 
In mortgage lending, qualification is determined by analyzing 
the applicant's financial background, including his income, net 
wealth, and overall credit history.11. These parameters are intri-
cately related. Whether an application is denied or modified not 
only depends on the applicant's financial resources but also 
hinges on the amount of the loan requested in relation to income, 
the length of maturity desired, and the ratio of the amount re-
quested to the appraised value of the collateral property. lUi For 
purposes of satisfying the prima facie requirement, if the plaintiff 
can produce statistics showing that those denied loans had figures 
which roughly approximated those granted loans in other neigh-
borhoods, then the financial portion of the qualification require-
ment would have been met. 
The property which will be the subject of the mortgage must 
also qualify. Included in the computation of qualification is the 
111 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971). 
111 [d. 
118 This conclusion can be drawn from the language in Griggs where the Court stated: 
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to every person re-
gardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command that any person be hired 
simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a mem-
ber of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, 
is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). Later, the Court quoted language 
from Senators Clark and Case (co-managers of the bill on the Senate floor) in discussing 
the legislative history of Title VII: "the proposed Title VII 'expressly protects the em-
ployer's right to insist that any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the ap-
plicable job qualifications.' " [d. at 434 (emphasis in original). 
114 1 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11 ch. 1, at 3. 
m [d. at xvii, xix. This last numerical relationship is known as the loan-to-value ratio. 
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security of the property as reflected in its appraised value,116 
which includes measures of risk of loss affecting the marketability 
of the property. Marketability will depend on the structural 
soundness of the dwelling and its overall condition. Other rele-
vant factors may include the number of building vacancies in the 
neighborhood, incidence of vandalism, and the presence or ab-
sence of necessary public services.117 A difficult problem arises 
where the plaintiff attempts to show that risk of loss is no greater 
in his neighborhood than in other neighborhoods where more 
mortgage loans are granted. Initially, it might be difficult to com-
pile data on things such as tax delinquencies, building vacancies, 
and housing code violations.lls Secondly, since the list of factors 
which can be used to measure risk is potentially very 10ng,119 and 
since the plaintiff probably has no idea which criteria the particu-
lar lending institution is actually using, a mere showing, for exam-
ple, that risk of vandalism or fire is no greater in neighborhood A 
than in neighborhood B may be meaningless. There are, however, 
additional statistics which a plaintiff might introduce which could 
evidence a systematic denial of mortgage loans within a given 
neighborhood. 
One method of discriminating against loan applicants in certain 
neighborhoods is through the use of appraisal practices.lIO When 
a bank is attempting to discourage lending in an area it may, 
without altering its policies regarding acceptable loan-to-value ra-
tios,121 underappraise property and thereby reduce the amount 
that it will be willing to lend in anyone loan. This raises the 
amount of the required downpayment, a factor which may be sig-
nificant enough to preclude purchase of the property. 122 
While lenders may underappraise property and thus not alter 
their loan-to-value ratios, the test for determining whether lend-
ers are systematically underappraising property is to compare ap-
praised value to purchase price from neighborhood to neighbor-
116 Id. ch. 1, at 3. 
117 Id. ch. 1, at 5. 
118 See 2 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11 app. A, where the process of compiling this type of 
data is discussed . 
... These factors may range from the individual criteria which are part of the appraised 
value formula to practically any neighborhood characteristic which a bank believes could 
influence the future market value of the property . 
... 1 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11, at xi . 
... See text at note 115, supra, for a definition of loan-to-value ratio. 
, •• 1 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11 ch. 4, at 1. 
----------~---~---
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hood.123 If the ratios of appriased value to purchase price are 
lower in neighborhoods claimed to be redlined than in other 
neighborhoods served by the bank, the plaintiff has not conclu-
sively proven that the bank has intentionally redlined, although 
he may have shown enough to shift the burden of rebutting the 
inference of discrimination over to the defendant. Just as the ef-
fects test allows the plaintiff to substitute an inference of discrim-
ination for actual proof of an intent to discriminate,124 the intro-
duction of statistics showing lower appraisal to purchase value 
ratios, while not in itself sufficient to prove intentional redlining, 
would at least be enough to warrant a shifting of the burden to 
the defendant to justify the lower figures in the neighborhood al-
leged to be redlined. 
Appraised values may be systematically lower than market val-
ues for several legitimate reasons: 1) appraisers may underesti-
mate the value of property because the consequences of doing so 
are more acceptable than if they overestimate the value-the risk 
of loss is greater where the property is overappraised should the 
borrower default on the loan;1lI6 2) lenders face greater uncertain-
ties in that they do not exercise the same amount of control over 
the property which borrowers do;1lI8 and 3) lenders might use a 
longer time horizon than the market in order to predict events 
which might affect the long-term value of the property which 
serves as security for the loan. In Introduction of appraisal statis-
tics can be a valuable tool. If, for example, lenders are basing 
their expectations of future market value on the number of aban-
doned buildings in the neighborhood or the incidence of vandal-
ism, these expectations should be reflected in lower appraised-to-
purchase-price ratios in the neighborhood alleged to be redlined. 
Assuming that a prima facie case is established, the burden will 
then shift to the lender who will have to articulate what criteria 
he uses and why he uses them.118 
••• [d. ch. 4, at 2 . 
• 14 See discussion of Griggs in text at notes 66-72, supra . 
••• 1 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11 ch. 4, at 2-3 . 
••• [d. ch. 4, at 3 . 
•• 7 [d. Assuming that as perceived risk increases, the appraised value of the property 
decreases, the use of a longer time horizon by lenders will necessarily result in lower ap-
praised values insofar as the longer the time frame, the greater the amount of uncertainty, 
and therefore, the greater the level of risk. 
U. In the JOINT STUDY, supra note 11, researchers were trying to determine whether 
systematic underappraisal took place independent of the lender's expectations of future 
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Another of the primary indicia of the existence of redlining is 
the disposition of mortgage loan applications according to neigh-
borhood. COI)sequently, regulations of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board require that loan applications be processed individu-
ally rather than on a neighborhood-wide basis!l. Presumably, 
this prevents lending institutions from drawing inaccurate and 
unfair generalizations regarding the risk associated with a partic-
ular neighborhood. Nevertheless, introduction of statistics by the 
plaintiff showing equivalent rates of default risk between neigh-
borhoods and unequal mortgage grants may create an inference 
that a lending institution is in fact redlining a neighborhood by 
not examining loan applications from that neighborhood on an 
individual basis. llo Specifically, a recent study concluded that de-
fault risk was associated neither with the age of the housing stock 
within a neighborhood nor with the age of the specific property 
being mortgaged.18l Rather, research produced three factors 
which had the greatest bearing on risk of default: 1) economic 
burden-the larger the ratio of loan payments to income, the 
more likely default will occur; 2) the amount of equity in the 
property-the larger the initial amount the less likely default will 
occur; and 3) building condition-buildings in poor condition 
were more likely to result in payment problems than buildings in 
good condition. III Assuming that the above factors are accurate 
measures of default risk, lenders would only be able to make a 
determination as to the level of risk involved in a particular loan 
by examining each loan application separately since factors will 
vary significantly among different buyers and different pieces of 
property within a given neighborhood. 
market value. Hence in concluding that systematic underappraisal was not commonplace, 
lower appraisals based on factors associated with risk of loss had already been factored out 
of the model. For purposes of establishing a prima facie case of redlining, these factors 
should not be removed because it forces the defendant to articulate his appraising criteria, 
thus affording the plaintiff the chance to challenge the reasonableness of the defendant's 
practices. 
"" See 12 C.F.R. § 531.8(b) (1979) at note 61, supra, bearing in mind that FHLBB 
regulations do not apply to all lending institutions. 
110 Default risk has been broken down into four subcategories: 1) the probability of de-
linquency; 2) the duration of delinquency; 3) the frequency of delinquency; and 4) the 
probability of foreclosure. 1 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11 ch. 3, at 103-04. 
181 [d. ch. 3, at 104. Indeed, if a lender subject to Board regulations were found to base 
his lending decisions on these two criteria, he would be in violation of FHLBB regulations. 
12 C.F.R. § 531.8(c) (1979). 
18. 1 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11 ch. 3, at 104. 
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If the plaintiff can produce statistics showing that the level of 
default risk in an area alleged to be redlined is equivalent to or 
lower than default rates in other neighborhoods, one could infer 
that either the defendant did not in fact use risk of default in 
determining whether or not to grant loans,133 or that the measure 
of default risk employed by the defendant was based on neighbor-
hood-wide generalizations regarding risk rather than on the char-
acteristics of the individual applications. Since it is almost a uni-
versal business practice to use risk of default in determining 
whether or not to grant a loan, the second possibility is more 
likely. A strong inference of redlining would then be created 
which would shift the burden to the defendant to explain the sta-
tistics on other grounds. 
D. The Business Necessity Defense 
1. Elements in General 
While Griggs v. Duke Power CO.13. opened new avenues of relief 
to victims of employment discrimination via the use of the dis-
criminatory effects test, it also provided the basis for a new de-
fense. Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation through a showing of disproportionate impact, the burden 
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the practice is re-
quired by business necessity.13& Under Griggs, a successful show-
ing of business necessity rests on the nebulous requirement that 
any employment tests must "fairly measure" knowledge or skills 
required for the class of job sought by the applicant.138 While the 
Griggs court provided the possibility of a business necessity de-
fense, it failed to furnish a more precise definition of the test. 
Subsequent cases have clarified the justification of business 
necessity. 
In the employment testing area, business necessity has been 
coupled with the requirement that employers demonstrate the 
job-relatedness of their testing devices.137 Frequently, employers 
attempt to prove job-relatedness by introducing statistical studies 
138 The Joint Study found that the amount of mortgage lending was not always consis-
tent with the expected relationship that lending decreases as risk rises. [d. at xiv. 
134 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
13. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
138 [d. at 433 n.9 (quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Guidelines). 
137 [d. at 431. . 
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to validate the employment tests used.13S In analyzing the suffi-
ciency of such a validity study the Fifth Circuit, in United States 
v. Georgia Po.wer CO.,139 provided clues as to the adequacy of cer-
tain aspects of the business necessity defense. The court con-
cluded that the employer's validity study was invalid, in part be-
. cause it was "wholly irrelevant" to the employer's test scoring 
techniques. HO The study was thus incapable of demonstrating any 
business necessity. HI 
The opinion in Georgia Power appears consistent with the un-
derlying rationale for employing the discriminatory effects test in 
the first place. Just as a showing of disproportionate impact does 
not require evidence that the defendant intended to discriminate, 
Georgia Power indicates that a sufficient showing of business ne-
cessity cannot be found in the employer's proof that he did not 
intend to discriminate, nor will his good faith attempt to verify 
that his practices were not discriminatory suffice. As in the effects 
test, business necessity is concerned with that which occurs in 
fact. If the plaintiff cannot demonstrate a disproportionate im-
pact in appropriate circumstances, then he has not presented a 
prima facie case of discrimination. Likewise, when the dispropor-
tionate impact is proven where the defendant fails to prove that 
his testing devices are in fact predictive of proper job perform-
ance, then he has not demonstrated an adequate business neces-
sity to justify the use of those testing devices. 
In some cases, courts have articulated the magnitude of busi-
ness necessity which must be demonstrated to overcome a prima 
facie Title VII case. One business phenomenon which has been 
particularly susceptible to Title VII actions has been union se-
138 In the employment area, validation studies consist of statistical data which employ-
ers use in an attempt to prove the job-relatedness of their testing devices. This is accom-
plished by establishing a correlation between test scores and job performance. 
130 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973). 
14. Basically, the employer required a passing score on each of a series of tests. However, 
the method used to validate the tests involved weighting the results on each of the tests 
and reaching a composite score. Because the scoring techniques used in the validation 
study differed from the techniques used by the employer in determining who was qualified 
for employment the court concluded, "[ilt is apparent that absolutely no relationship was 
demonstrated between successful job performance and the ability to achieve the Com-
pany-established cutoff score on each test in the battery." Id. at 917. 
,., Id. There, the court found that while the Equal Opportunity Commission guidelines 
regarding validation studies need not be followed to the letter, they did serve as a valid 
framework for determining whether such a study was adequate, and therefore the guide-
lines could not be ignored absent a cogent reason for non-compliance. Id. at 913. 
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niority systems.142 In one of the leading cases,I.3 the Second Cir-
cuit found that where seniority and transfer provisions of a labor 
contract perpetuated prior admittedly discriminatory practices by 
"locking" discriminatorally assigned employees into their jobs, 
business necessity required more than a showing that the system 
served a legitimate management function. 14. Not only must the 
system directly foster safety and efficiency, it must be "essential" 
to those goals.1411 If safety and efficiency could be served by a 
"reasonably" available alternative with less discriminatory effect, 
then the seniority system would have to be modified. I.e In the 
same year, the Fourth Circuit phrased the test in terms of an 
"overriding legitimate business purpose" which could not be ac-
commodated by an "acceptable" alternative having lesser differ-
ential impact.147 
As the seniority cases suggest, what is at issue is the legitimacy 
and importance of the business interest claimed to be served and, 
most important, whether the business practice at issue is neces-
sary to effectuate the asserted business interest. Assuming that a 
legitimate business interest is to maximize profits, it is a rela-
tively simple matter to phrase employee qualifications and other 
general policies in terms of efficiency and productivity-terms 
which imply the furtherence of a legitimate business motive. The 
courts' use of the terms "essential" and "overriding" imply that 
the essence of the problem is determining whether a particular 
business practice is sufficiently necessary to justify a discrimina-
tory effect. Different business practices will trigger different 
threshholds of necessity depending on the level of discriminatory 
... See, e.g., United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 426 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 471 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 
(1973); Peters v. Missouri-Pac. RR, 483 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
1002 (1973); United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Head v. Timken 
Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Carey v. Greyhound Bus Co., 500 F.2d 
1372 (5th Cir. 1974); Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974), 
rev'd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 
F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1975). 
"s United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971) . 
... [d. at 658. Title VII permits employers to apply different terms or conditions of 
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system as long as there is no intention to 
discriminate. The court found that where the seniority system perpetuated the effects of 
past discrimination, the seniority system was not bona fide. [d. at 661. 
••• [d. at 662 . 
••• [d . 
... Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed under Rule 
60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). 
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impact.H8 This suggests the possibility that the business necessity 
defense operates on a sliding scale whereby the defendant will be 
expected to ~bsorb higher costs as the discriminatory impact of 
the challenged practice becomes more severe. 
In order for the defendant to demonstrate that a particular 
practice is "necessary" for the furtherence of a legitimate busi-
ness interest, it must be shown that no reasonable alternative 
policy exists which would have a lesser discriminatory effect.148 
The determination of reasonableness is dependent on the level of 
discriminatory effect: using the sliding scale, costlier alternatives 
will be deemed "reasonable" as the level of disproportionate im-
pact rises. The issue of reasonable alternatives was examined by 
the Eighth Circuit in a case where the defendant refused to con-
sider job applicants who had been convicted of crimes other than 
minor traffic offenses. ll1O The court concluded that while such con-
siderations would be relevant in making individual hiring deci-
sions, a practice which served as an absolute bar to employment 
swept too broadly and was therefore invalid. ll11 
While cases involving business necessity generally revolve 
around matters of efficiency, productivity, or, in the case of gov-
ernmental bodies, public policy,1II2 business necessity in the con-
text of mortgage redlining focuses on financial risk. Financial con-
siderations were involved in Boyd v. Lefrak Organization. 1118 
There, the plaintiffs challenged a landlord's practice of requiring 
... Compare, for example, the seniority cases with the cases discussed in note 149, infra. 
, •• See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971). 
Whether the burden of showing reasonable alternatives in a Title VII action shifts back to 
the plaintiff, or whether it remains with the defendant is unclear. See Hsia, supra note 79, 
at 783-84 n.36. In a class action brought under Title VII, the Court indicated that had 
defendant met his burden of showing that employment tests were job-related, it was then 
open for the complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices would serve 
the employer's legitimate business interests with less discriminatory effect. Albermarle Pa-
per Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 801-02 (1973». It has been noted that the Court also endorsed Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission regulations (29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(3), (4) (1974» which would 
appear to leave the burden with the employer to demonstrate that there are no alterna-
tives with less discriminatory effect. Hsia, supra note 79, at 783-84 n.36 . 
... Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) . 
... Id. at 1298. Of critical importance was testimony indicating that not every ex-of-
fender would be a poor employee and that such a policy would foster recidivism. Id . 
... See United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1186-87 (8th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (city required to demonstrate compelling governmental 
interest to overcome discriminatory effect of local ordinance). 
lOS 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975). 
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a tenant's weekly net income to be equal to a specified percentage 
of his monthly rent on the grounds that the practice excluded all 
but a small percentage of public assistance recipients, the large 
majority of whom were either black or Puerto Rican.1M The court 
not only denied the plaintiffs' claim, it also refused to apply the 
discriminatory effects and business necessity tests to a claim 
brought under the Fair Housing Act. 11111 
The dissent in Boyd would have applied the Griggs standard to 
claims brought under the Act. Thus, where the landlord's policy 
was shown to have a disproportionate impact on minorities, he 
would be required to demonstrate the business necessity of such a 
policy. The dissent agreed that the landlord in Boyd had the right 
to adopt the reasonable economic standards designed to ensure 
the future payment of rent,I" but the dissent would have invali-
dated the landlord's chosen policy insofar as no evidence was 
presented which tended to prove that the particular income re-
quirement was necessary to guarantee the continued economic vi-
ability of the organization.m Hence, while the dissent found that 
the defendant had asserted a legitimate business interest, there 
was no showing that a less discriminatory alternative did not 
exist. 
2. Considerations for Redlining 
The business necessity defense in the context of a redlining 
case will focus on the following three considerations: 1) Is there a 
legitimate business interest justifying the adoption of specific 
lending criteria which have the effect of denying mortgage funds 
to disproportionate numbers of persons protected under the Fair 
Housing Act? 2) Do the criteria used in determining whether or 
not mortgage lenders will supply funds actually further that busi-
ness interest? 3) Are there nevertheless any other criteria which 
could be employed in evaluating the suitability of property for 
mortgage assistance which would not have the effect of denying 
access to funds in entire neighborhoods predominantly inhabited 
by members of a protected class? The first two parts of the busi-
ness necessity defense in a redlining case are integrally related . 
... [d. at 1112. 
, •• [d. at 1114. See discussion of discriminatory effect under the Fair Housing Act in 
text at notes 79-93, supra. 
, .. [d. at 1116 . 
... [d. at 1117-18. 
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Certainly, minimization of risk is a legitimate business goal be-
cause it ensures the maximization of long-term profits. However, 
whether that. goal is sufficient to overcome a showing of discrimi-
natory effect will depend upon the specific lending criteria used 
and whether those criteria significantly further the goal of mini-
mizing the risk to which the lender's funds are exposed. There-
fore, as the level of discriminatory impact increases, a closer 
nexus between the criteria employed and the furtherence of the 
desired goal will be required. 
Assuming that the criteria sufficiently fulfill their purpose, the 
third aspect of the defense examines whether legitimate business 
goals could be reached through means which have a less discrimi-
natory effect. Here, the viability of less discriminatory alterna-
tives will be a function of both the increase in costs borne by the 
defendant and the amount by which the disproportionate impact 
is reduced. To put this another way, an alternative will not be 
forced on the defendant where the cost of compliance is high and 
the reduction of discriminatory effect is minimal. On the other 
hand, an alternative may be required in spite of its high cost if 
the level of discriminatory effect is high under the existing prac-
tice and stands to be reduced significantly. However, it is possible 
for the defendant to present other valid defenses which do not 
fall into the business necessity category. 
Demonstration of a sufficient business necessity in a redlining 
case concentrates on the adequacy of the criteria employed to 
minimize economic risk to the lender. However, there may be 
other factors which are responsible for a paucity of loans being 
granted in a given area which are unrelated to risk. Where these 
factors are independent of specific bank policies, a lending insti-
tution will not offer them to justify its practices, but rather to 
explain why few loans are made in a specific area irrespective of 
its lending criteria. The offering of a defense based on the pro-
duction of extrinsic circumstances would not appear to require 
that the defendant satisfy the three-pronged business necessity 
test. 
For example, a lending institution may not lend frequently in a 
particular neighborhood due to lack of demand. This might occur 
because there are few unoccupied homes, or a low turnover of 
homes that are occupied.lIi8 The latter possibility is particularly 
... 1 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11 ch. 1, at 4-5. 
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likely in areas with many long-term residents who have paid off 
their mortgages and who are not interested in refinancing their 
homes and incurring additional debt.lIi9 Alternatively, mortgage 
demand might be relaxed because housing demand is being satis-
fied elsewhere. If the homes in a neighborhood become obsolete 
due to size or lack of facilities, then residents may relocate to 
other neighborhoods, with the result that housing prices in the 
old neighborhood fall. ISO With falling prices, automatic neighbor-
hood disinvestment results since smaller loans are required to 
purchase individual pieces of property. Therefore, as the amount 
of the average loan decreases, the aggregate value of all loans out-
standing in the area will also be reduced. l6l However, falling 
prices may actually discourage lending due to the increased risk 
associated with uncertainty regarding future prices!SI Arguably, 
if banks are not lending because few people are applying for loans 
it is less likely that anyone will be challenging the bank's prac-
tices in the first place. Nonetheless, if neighborhood disinvest-
ment is taking place because banks claim that falling prices are 
creating unjustifiably high levels of risk, the reasonableness of 
this claim would be a proper matter for the trier of fact in the 
context of the business necessity defense. 
External considerations bearing upon restrictive lending may 
support the defendant's case and be virtually unassailable by the 
plaintiff. For example, an institution's internal policies regarding 
diversification of risk are supplemented by federal regulations on 
the maximum percentage of funds which any single institution 
may have in anyone particular type of investment. ISS If a defen-
dant had already reached the regulatory mortgage quota, it would 
have no choice but to discontinue those types of loans. Likewise, 
lO·Id. 
,e. Id. ch. I, at 12. 
18' Id. 
,e. See generally id. ch. I, at 12, 15. 
,e. Lending institutions which are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency are 
generally limited to an outstanding aggregate balance of real estate loans not to exceed the 
amount of the institution's unimpaired capital plus unimpaired surplus (as defined in 12 
C.F.R. § 7.1100(b) (1979)), or 100% of the time and savings deposits of the bank, which-
ever is greater. 12 C.F.R. § 7.2155 (1979). Regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board, which regulates the institutions that make the majority of real estate loans, are 
much more complicated. While some types of mortgage loans are not subject to percent-
age-of-assets or percentage-of-savings-accounts limitations, other types of loans including 
loans for housing for the aging, and loans for urban renewal are subject to specific restric-
tions. These lending restrictions are contained in 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6-1 to 545.6-26 (1979). 
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the existence of state usury laws limiting the amount of interest 
which can be charged on mortgage loans might have an effect on 
the bank's supply of loanable funds. Ie .. If the current market rates 
of interest are above the usury limit, funds will be diverted to 
out-of-state borrowers willing to pay the higher rates with the re-
sult that the supply of funds for in-state borrowers will be 
reduced. lei 
Broad business policy reasons may underlie a limitation on the 
amount of mortgage funds available in certain neighborhoods. 
These strategic business policies would be subject to evaluation 
under the three considerations of the business necessity de-
fense. lee For example, one method of promoting financial stabil-
ity, if not greater long-term profits, is to reduce overall risk by 
diversifying an institution's loan portfolio.le7 This means that a 
bank will decide not only what percentage of its total supply of 
loanable funds to invest in real estate, but also what percentage 
of real estate funds should be invested in which areas. l88 Thus, a 
refusal to grant additional loans in a particular neighborhood may 
be justified on the grounds that the supply of loanable funds allo-
cable to that area has been exhausted. Nevertheless, the pivotal 
question again becomes one of risk. Invariably, the supply of 
funds is based on perceived risk; thus, the criteria used in mea-
suring risk and the effect which those criteria have on the overall 
allocation of funds can always be challenged by the plaintiff. 
Some strategic policies, although based on sound management 
criteria, would nevertheless fail to pass muster under the business 
necessity defense. Included under this category would be any 
strategy which precludes the need to consider loan applications 
individually. Such a practice, besides being in violation of Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board regulations,le8 would probably be invalid 
because less drastic alternatives exist and therefore, it "sweeps 
too broadly."170 For example, a lender may have information that 
a sizeable percentage of the residents of a neighborhood are not 
, .. For a discussion of the New York usury law and its effect on the supply of mortgage 
funds in New York, see generally 1 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11 ch. 2. 
'8. Id. The MIT-Harvard study concluded that this indeed happens under New York's 
usury statute. 
'88 See text at p. 389, supra. 
'8, 1 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11 ch. 1, at 2. 
'88Id. 
'8' See 12 C.F.R. § 531.8(b) (1979) at note 61, supra. 
170 See Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975). 
1979] REDLINING 393 
creditworthy. Therefore, it might adopt a practice of not lending 
in a particular area in order to save money on the administrative 
costs of processing loan applications which would result in few 
actual loans. 171 Another management strategy not based on a par-
ticular area which nevertheless could have an impermissible dis-
parate impact would be a minimum loan size requirement. If 
processing and servicing costs are independent of the loan size, an 
institution might decide to set such a minimum in order to maxi-
mize the return on its investment.172 Such a policy should not be' 
upheld where large numbers of minority applicants do not have 
the resources to borrow the minimum amount of money rquired. 
In general, these policies cannot be justified when the marginal 
increase in institutional cost is compared to resulting discrimina-
tory impact in a situation where obvious alternatives exist.l78 
The criteria used to measure creditworthiness and risk of loss 
are likely to be the subject of much attention in future redlining 
litigation. As mentioned earlier, creditworthiness is generally de-
termined on the basis of the applicant's income, employment ex-
perience and prospects, assets, liabilities, and overall credit his-
tory.m Risk of loss generally takes into account not only the 
condition of the building as reflected by its appraised value, but 
also characteristics of the neighborhood such as the number of 
housing code violations, property tax delinquencies, serious fires, 
vandalism, and vacant buildings.17II Research indicates that in-
dividual financial constraints and the condition of the property 
are significantly related to risk of default.178 Thus, the issue in the 
future will probably be whether the standards set by the sum of 
individual criteria are sufficiently related to the goal of minimiz-
ing risk as to justify the discriminatory effect on a neighborhood. 
Some guidance in this area is provided by the dissent in Boyd 
v. Lefrak Organization,177 which did not quarrel with the land-
17l 1 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11 ch. 1, at 8 . 
.. I [d. ch. 1, at 17. I 
.. a The Joint Study also cites the example where the bank restricts mortgage lending to 
depositors in times of tight credit even though the depositors are predominantly white. [d. 
ch. 1, at 8. Contrary to the conclusion reached in the Study, such a policy probably would 
not constitute a sufficient business necessity defense insofar as the harm to members of a 
protected class would greatly outweigh the cost of using a less discriminatory alternative. 
"4 [d. ch. 1, at 3 . 
.. & [d. at xiii . 
.. 8 [d. ch. 3, at 105 . 
.. 7 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975). 
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lord's setting of minimum income requirements but inquired 
whether the particular standard set was necessary to serve its al-
leged purpose.178 If a lender specifies a certain income to loan ra-
tio,179 by this standard it must show that this ratio is the absolute 
minimum ratio that will reasonably satisfy the bank's risk param-
eters. If a slightly lower ratio could be used which would cure the 
discriminatory effect demonstrated by the plaintiff without a sig-
nificant rise in risk, then the defendant has not demonstrated a 
sufficient business necessity for leaving the requirement as it 
stands. ISO 
V. CONCLUSION 
Challenging the practice of redlining through judicial action 
poses certain practical and conceptual problems. Traditionally, 
courts have frequently required proof of discriminatory intent. In 
virtually all cases, proving an intent to discriminate is a practical 
impossibility. Even if proving intent were simple, it is evident 
that only a small percentage of the harmful lending practices 
would be affected. The solution is reached by first expanding the 
definition of redlining, then using the discriminatory effects test 
which lets the plaintiff prove discrimination indirectly. Finally, a 
liberal reading of the discrimination provisions of the Fair Hous-
ing Act must be accepted. 
Under the analysis proposed in this article, several elements 
serve to establish a prima facie case of redlining under Title VIII. 
The use of the discriminatory effects test provides evidence of 
discrimination by first requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate 
that the lending practices of the defendant have a disproportion-
ate impact on a class protected under Title VIII. Second, the 
plaintiff must show that those injured by the practice were indeed 
qualified for the loans which they were denied. An adequate dem-
onstration that the plaintiff was qualified is a potentially difficult 
task as he must show that he met the lender's financial require-
... Id. at 1117-18 . 
.. 0 One factor which lending institutions consider is the amount of the loan requested in 
relation to the applicant's yearly income. The Study found that applications were more 
likely to be rejected when the requested amount exceeded twice the applicant's yearly 
income. 1 JOINT STUDY, supra note 11, at xix. 
, •• Likewise, if a bank requires that a neighborhood have a certain number of fire hy-
drants per block, the bank must demonstrate that to remove the requirement would sub-
ject the bank to unreasonably high levels of risk on loans granted in that neighborhood. 
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ments and that the risk of loss associated with the property was 
within acceptable levels. Once the plaintiff presents sufficient evi-
dence to establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the de-
fendant to justify his lending practices. 
Business necessity may be shown by first explaining the busi-
ness interest to be served by using the individual sets of criteria 
involved in a lending decision. Next, the defendant must show 
how those criteria further that legitimate business interest and, 
finally must show why no alternative criteria will satisfy the 
lender's business objectives equally well. A requirement that he 
demonstrate sufficient business necessity is thus a heavy burden 
for the defendant. Assuming that most varieties of business prac-
tices are ultimately geared towards the goal of maximizing profits, 
only practices sufficiently necessary to achieve those ends should 
remain where the alternative is the perpetuation of "built-in 
headwinds" against those who are trying to secure better housing. 
The utilization of the effects test provides a basic means of chal-
lenging all undesirable lending practices included in the expanded 
definition of redlining, while the use of this test removes the oner-
ous requirement that the plaintiff prove discriminatory intent. 
The test thus provides a streamlined mechanism through which 
aggrieved parties may more effectively curb the incidence of 
mortgage discrimination. 
